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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
(which would require the pleading of special damages). 102 Thus,
the intentional infliction of serious mental distress without physical
impact is actionable per se without the necessity of pleading special
damages.103
Where special damages are an integral element of the cause
of action, the courts require considerable particularity, especially in
the libel and slander cases. Thus, allegations such as those pleaded
in Cowan ' 0 4 that the pleader had suffered special damages, with
no attempt at itemization, will be deemed a pleading of general
damages. Where the special damages supporting the cause of
action are the loss of customers, as in Hecht, the specific cus-
tomers lost must be named. 10 5 Furthermore, even where the
plaintiff names specific customers who have been lost, the loss con-
stituting special damages, the court may characterize the damages
as too speculative and dismiss the complaint. 106
The early CPLR cases indicate that under rule 3015(d), the
courts may require considerable specificity in the pleading of special
damages in all actions where they are sought. In view of the re-
tention of the bill of particulars under the CPLR, such a practice
would be lamentable. 10
7
Bill of Particulars -Broad Interpretation of Rule 3042
The function of a bill of particulars is to amplify the pleading,
limit the proof, and prevent surprise at the trial.'0 s When the
02 Halio v. Laurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't
1961).
103 Ibid.
104 41 Misc. 2d 198, 245 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1963); accord, Leather
Dev. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 761, 224 N.Y.S.2d
513 (2d Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 909, 188 N.E.2d 270, 237 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (1963).
10 Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n,
186 N.Y. 437, 79 N.E. 710 (1906); Henkin v. News Syndicate Co., 27 Misc.
2d 987, 210 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. C. 1960).
1O6 Trachtenberg Bros. v. Henrietta Steins, Inc., 64 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
107The current federal practice rules do not provide for a bill of
particulars since its purposes could be adequately served by a motion to
make more definite, expanded machinery of discovery, and the pretrial
conference. 2 MooRz, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 1217-20 (2d ed. 1948). In ac-
cordance with the federal practice the First and Final Reports of the
Advisory Committee omitted any provision for the bill of particulars. How-
ever, the change was rejected by the Codes Committee and the bill of
particulars is retained in the CPLR. See 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 190,
215 n.54 (1963).
108 Solomon v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 1017, 174 N.Y.S.2d
85 (2d Dep't 1958); Runals v. Niagara Univ., 16 Misc. 2d 853, 185 N.Y.S.2d
315 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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demanding party considers a bill of particulars insufficient, he may
move under Rule 3042 of the CPLR for an order precluding the
adverse party from introducing at trial any evidence on the items
which were not sufficiently particularized in the bill. A frequent
problem under the predecessor of this rule10 9 arose where the
defendant had rightfully demanded certain particulars which plain-
tiff was unable to furnish at that time, but which he might have
been able to furnish at a later date. Many of the courts faced with
such a situation granted the motion to preclude, but made it con-
ditional upon failure to serve a bill within a specified time ranging
from ten to thirty days from service of the preclusion order.110
Failure to comply with the conditional order often resulted in a
final order of preclusion."'
On the other hand, many courts indicated that where an
attorney had furnished the most detailed bill which circumstances
permitted, and stated an inability to particularize some aspects of
the claim at that time, an order of preclusion would not be
granted." 2
In a recent case,"' defendant demanded a bill of particulars
specifying which injuries plaintiff would claim as permanent in
his personal injury action. Because the injury had accrued only
seven months before the demand, plaintiff claimed inability to
specify at the moment which injuries he would claim as perma-
nent, and defendant deemed the bill insufficient. 1 4 Defendant's
motion to preclude was denied, instead, the court ordered plaintiff
to furnish a further bill of particulars which would specify the
permanent injuries and set a time limit within which such bill
would have to be served (the time being based on the court's
estimate of when the information should be available to the
109 CPA § 115.
110 Dusing v. Rosasco, 31 Misc. 2d 825, 220 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Rotendi v. Vaughan, 28 Misc. 2d 656, 220 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Desimore v. Robertson, 19 Misc. 2d 80, 189 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
111 Jackson v. Antoniac, 13 App. Div. 2d 837, 216 N.Y.S.2d 174 (2d Dep't
1961).
112 Runals v. Niagara Univ., supra note 108; see Decker v. Norton, Lilly
& Co., 20 Misc. 2d 948, 195 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Conver v. City
of Fulton, 104 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; In re Ernst's Will, 194 Misc.
237, 86 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Surr. Ct. 1949). On one occasion the court ordered
the plaintiff to particularize to the best of his current knowledge and furnish
further particulars within a specified period after the examination before
trial. Rowe v. Levine, 15 App. Div. 2d 571. 222 N.Y.S.2d 951 (2d Dep't
1961).
113 Giles v. Cornell, 40 Misc. 2d 991, 244 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Nassau County
Dist. Ct. 1963).
114 Plaintiff had stated: "Some or all of injuries may be permanent
in nature. But full extent of permanency cannot be determined at this time."
The court declared that this was too indefinite and hence the bill was
insufficient. Id. at 991, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
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plaintiff). The time limitation established, thirteen months, was
sufficiently in the future so that plaintiff would be able to comply
with the order.
The result reached in the principal case seems to balance the
interests of the parties in an equitable manner. The granting of a
preclusion order against a diligent plaintiff who is unable at the
time to provide the information requested would have been an
unfair result. He would be prevented from establishing even his
permanent injuries since the courts still prevent him from reserv-
ing the right in his bill of particulars to amplify his claim for
permanent injuries that appear later.115 His recourse is held to
be a motion to amend his bill, which motion could be granted only
if prejudice to the defendant would not result.116
On the other hand, if the court held a bill sufficient merely
because a party states he is unable to furnish the particulars cur-
rently, the defendant, who has a right to know the permanency
of the injuries claimed in order to prepare effectively for trial,
would be seriously prejudiced. In short, the court, by taking the
middle position between two extremes, has interpreted rule 3042(d)
broadly and reached an equitable result.
DISCLOSURE
Scope of Disclosure in Defamation Actions
In Nomako v. Ashton," 7 the appellate division of the first
department held that a pretrial examination will be granted in a
slander action without requiring that any special circumstances be
shown. Previously, first department cases held that special cir-
cumstances were required before a pretrial examination would be
permitted in defamation actions." 8 The court in Nomako found
that "there is no longer persuasive reason for a general policy
against examinations in intentional tort cases, including defamation
actions."
"15 Brett v. Sinon, 277 App. Div. 890, 98 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1950);
see also Chimere v. Steinle, 237 N.Y.S2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
116 See, e.g., Handsel v. Weltz, 13 App. Div. 2d 679, 213 N.Y.S.2d 795
(2d Dep't 1961); Overgaard v. Brooklyn Bus Corp., 237 App. Div. 829,
12 N.Y.S.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1939).
"7 247 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1st Dep't 1964).
118 E.g., Murphy v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 800,
188 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1959); Kollsman Instruments Corp. v. Daily
Mirror Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 975, 183 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1st Dep't 1959);
Olian v. Random House, 205 Misc. 878, 130 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
The rule in the second department is that an examination before trial is
permitted in a libel action without proof of special circumstances. E.g.,
Milner v. Long Island Daily Press Pub. Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 519, 205
N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1960).
